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PREFACE
Ken I. Boodhoo is Associate Professor of International
Relations at Florida International University. A student
of Caribbean affairs and a native of Trinidad, Dr. Boodhoo
has recently conducted research throughout the Eastern
Caribbean and is completing a book-length work on the Grenadan
Revolution and its destruction by the events of October,
1983, from which the present study is taken. Comments or
inquiries about the paper are welcomed and should be addressed
to the author at the Department of International Relations.
Publication of this work has been made possible in part by a
grant from the Florida International Foundation, Inc.
Mark B. Rosenberg
Director
Introduction
Just after midnight on October 25, 1983, a thirty-five
member team of elite United States troops, the Delta Force,
parachuted on to the island of Grenada. Its task was to clear
the controversial new airport runway to permit the easy entry
of thousands of U.S. forces to follow in a few hours. On the
other side of the island U.S. Naval Seals, another crack unit,
attempted to come ashore. Its objective was the old Pearl's
Airport. Both these forward units of the U.S. suffered heavy
casualties in proportion to their individual size. However,
the immediate entry of over 15,000 U.S. combat troops, more
than ten percent of the Grenadian population, supported by
enormous air and sea power, assured the invading forces of a
rapid victory over a largely demoralized group of the week-
old Revolutionary Military Council.
The U.S. invasion of Grenada was formally at the invitation
of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, a group of
English-speaking micro-states, of which Grenada itself, is a
member. It came after a week of chaos in Grenada, highlighted
by the assassination of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, some of
his cabinet members and large numbers of his supporters; the
overthrow of the Peoples Revolutionary Government; the establish-
ment of the dictatorial Revolutionary Military Council; the
declaration of a harsh and repressive state of emergency.
Possibly what occurred on October 25, 1983 was the culmi-
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nation of over thirty years of steadily escalating levels of
violence and coercion in that country, that begun with the
return of native son Eric Gairy to Grenada in 1950. Even
though the Grenadian political system was formally patterned
after the British Westminster model of parliamentary democracy,
as the Gairy years progressed, the model became a facade for
one-man rulership. In effect, Gairy evolved as a parliamentary
dictator. Especially in his later years, his use of force and
repression earned him the title of the "English-speaking Papa
Doc". Gairy's government was overthrown in an early morning
coup led by Maurice Bishop. Four and one half years later
the Bishop government ended more brutally with the assassination
of Bishop and some members of his Cabinet.
Just as the assassination of Maurice Bishop generally
reflected the recent history of Grenada, in a similar manner,
the U.S. invasion is in keeping with that country's tradition
of relationship with hemispheric nations. The U.S. has inter-
vened in the domestic affairs of regional states over thirty
three times.
The formal rationale for the U.S. intervention was to
protect the lives of U.S. citizens there, especially the
American students attending the medical school; to forestall
further chaos on the island; and the argument that Grenada,
under Maurice Bishop, presented a security threat to the United
States. The practical reasons, nevertheless, were more related
to the very existence of the Bishop regime in Grenada. Within
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a few days of the establishment of the Bishop government,
the U.S. warned the regime against the establishment and
strengthening of relations with Cuba. On precisely the day
following this warning, Grenada announced the establishment
of formal diplomatic relations with Cuba. The stage was set
for four and one-half years of rhetorical warfare between
the two countries.
Not only was Grenada perceived as a security threat.
Potentially, its establishment of an essentially anti-
capitalistic economic system could also be a potential
economic model for regional states. The Grenadian experiment
was occurring at a time when the Caribbean economic condition
was experiencing steady deterioration. Further the capitalist
model of development: the Puerto Rican "Bootstrap" approach,
had not only largely failed in Puerto Rico, but had further
created economic stagnation in the Dominican Republic and
Jamaica, two close allies of the U.S.
To the degree that the Grenada model of self-reliance had
begun to show some results: unemployment was reduced and
basic needs met, could possibly have caused that model to be
increasingly attractive for neighboring states. But because
the model placed a reduced emphasis on the role of foreign
investment as the motivation for economic development, meant
that in the long run the U.S. investor's role in the region
could have been substantially reduced. Since, historically,
U.S. foreign policy has been concerned with the protection
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and expansion of U.S. economic interests, it is unlikely that
the U.S. would have permitted the Grenada model to be success-
ful.
Why was it necessary for revolutionary Grenada to pursue
a path of economic development largely contradicting previous
models? Undoubtedly, the Bishop regime would argue that the
models previously employed did not contribute to the allevia-
tion of unemployment and meeting of the basic needs of the
Grenadian population. Having therefore studied the past
failures it would be almost inevitable that leadership would
look to alternatives for restructuring the Grenadian economy.
The focus of this monograph is upon the four and one-half
year experiment by Bishop and his group in Grenada, and the
response of the United States to this experiment. It concludes
with the belief that the U.S. will not permit the existence of
any regime in the region, after Cuba, that threats what the
U.S. perceives as its vital interests in the hemisphere.
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PART I
Revolutionary Grenada
On the morning of March 13, 1979, Maurice Bishop spoke
to Grenadians on the newly declared Radio Free Grenada
stating:1
"At 4:15a.m. this morning the People's
Revolutionary Army seized control of
the army barracks at True Blue....the
forces of the Grenada army were com-
pletely defeated....I am calling upon
the...people...to join our armed rev-
olutionary forces...Virtually all
(police) stations have surrendered..."
Thus was Gairy's thirty-year domination of Grenada ended in
a swift and bold stroke, and the English-speaking Caribbean
experienced its first governmental change by non-peaceful
means.
While the final act of overthrow was sudden and decisive,
it was the indirect result of some years of planning and
organization. Coard later stated 2 that the NJM, especially
after the 1976 General Elections, was forced to quietly devel-
op a "disciplined, organized, tightly-knit security-conscious
party", as a consequence of Gairy's increased repression and
the shutting off of public avenues for debate. This organi-
zation included the establishment of a clandestine armed wing
of the party which served as the nucleus of the Peoples
Revolutionary Army (PRA) - formerly established after the over-
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throw of Gairy. Further the NJM had developed close linkages
with sympathizers in both the Police services and the army.
This linkage served both as a conduit for information and for
arms.
On Saturday March 10, 1979, Bishop later claimed3 , his
contacts within the Police services informed him of a Gairy
plan to search for and detain six leading members of the NJM.
As a consequence, the group went into hiding. On the following
Monday an army informant told the NJM that Gairy had planned
to leave Grenada at noon on that day, leaving clear the oppor-
tunity to assasinate the NJM leadership. The NJM leadership
immediately decided to stage a coup against the government.
JWhile Bishop later admitted4 the decision to stage the coup
"was in a sense forced along by the events of the weekend",
he willingly confessed "that it is (was) something we had
thought about for months before".
Between Monday afternoon and into the evening plans were
formulated and finalized for the attack. The group particip-
ating in this meeting were the NJM leadership and a few top
officers of the provisional PRA. By midnight a total force of
under 200 congregated in the vicinity of the True Blue army
barracks. An approximately 45 member sector led by Hudson
Hustin led the assault on the barracks. The soldiers were all
asleep. They simply fled as their buildings burnt. Another
group took over the radio station with hardly a shot fired.
A number of small groups went to the homes of members of Gairy's
Cabinet and took them into custody. Some members of the Mongoose
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gang were also placed in jail. By that evening about 60 per-
sons had been placed in custody. Two were killed during the
brief skirmishes as Police Stations throughout the country
began displaying the white flag of surrender.
In the brief planning for the coup the NJM had assumed
that once the attacks begun, the attackers would be joined by
large numbers of the discontented. Further it was hoped, as
the numbers of attackers and supporters increased, Gairy's
supporters, including those in the army and in the Police ser-
vices would surrender. Fortunately for the NJH both assumptions
proved correct.
Lawyer Victor Noel, a lower-ranking NJM member at the
time of the coup, the future Attorney General and eventually
detainee of the Peoples Revolutionary Government (PRG), sum-
marized popular attitude to the coup, 5
"I must confess that the way it was
done...made no difference to me, and
I am positive to thousands and thou-
sands of other freedom-loving
Grenadians; all that mattered was
that Gairy was out."
He continued,6
"the air of relief and instant
jubilation in those days was truly
like the dawn of a new day. Every-
where, men and women...were shaking
hands warmly and embracing each
other with feeling"
Ultimately, however, Noel became disenchanted with the PRG,
lost his position and was imprisoned, not being released
until the revolution ended in October 1983.
In his speech on the morning of the take-over Maurice
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Bishop stated the broad objectives of the new government. He
said7
"People of Grenada, this revolution
is for work, for food, for decent
housing and health service, and for
a brighter future for our children
and great-grandchildren. The bene-
fits of the revolution will be given
to everyone regardless of political
opinion or which political party
they support."
Thus did Maurice Bishop outline the broad goals of his govern-
ment with the emphasis upon social and economic change for the
Grenadian masses. 1While the emphasis was upon fulfilling the
basic needs of the broad masses of the society, the rhetoric
was nationalistic and populist in orientation. Very few could
argue with the government's basic goals or even with the method
of appeal. As the years progressed, nevertheless, the rhetoric
of the revolution, became increasingly radical even "Marxist-
Leninist". Thus the fundamental question of the Peoples
Revolutionary Government (PRG) has remained: how much was the
revolution a revolution of vocabulary, and how much did it
attempt to transform ideas and values. Further, it is signi-
ficant to note that the NJM, practically, was split into two
ideological wings, which nevertheless, did not detract from
the harmony of the movement until the final few months. One
tightly-knit group was the OREL, under Bernard Coard's leader-
ship, with the emphasis upon the Marxist-Leninist approach
to social relations. The remainder were the eclectic Bishop
followers who from time to time appeared to vacillate between
populism and social democratic inclinations. One of the more
fascinating aspects of the revolution remains the harmonious
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accomodation of the groups to each other until the final few
months.
Political Policies and Program
A fundamental objective of Bishop's Movement for the
Assemblies of the People (MAP) in the early 1970's, even be-
fore the establishment of the NJM, was to move Grenada away
from the inherited British Westminster-form of government, to
the innovative Assemblies of the People. The twenty-five year
rule of Eric Gairy had demonstrated that while in principle,
there was little fault with the British-type system of govern-
ment, in practice parliamentary democracy, in Grenada, had
indirectly permitted one-man authoritarian rulership, even in
the presence of the formal apparatus of the Westminster system:
constitution, Cabinet, elections and a parliament. This notion
of power and decision-making emanating from the broadest groups
in society was borrowed from the writings of Trinidadian
Marxist C.L.R. James, who argued that the proletariat could
have a significant impact upon the direction of the society.
Developing the ideas of the MAP, the 1973 NJM Manifesto
declared8 that the Party
"stands solidly behind People's
Assemblies as the new form of
government that will involve all
the people...To us, People's
Assemblies will bring in true
democracy."
But the Party recognized that the People's Assemblies would
require some time to be organized, hence the Manifesto, ini-
tially, called for power to reside in the hands of a
"Provisional Government", representing "a cross-section of the
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population" among whose tasks would include the organization
of the Assemblies. It was envisaged that the lowest level of
assembly would bring together adults in a village; each village
assembly would send two representatives to a Parish Assembly.
At another level, but essentially similar in structure and
purpose would be the Worker Assembly. All Assemblies were
entitled to send representatives to a National Assembly, the
latter replacing the parliament of the Westminster system. An
elected Council of the National Assembly would be charged in
effecting national decisions, and its members would head the
special departments in the country's civil service.9
After the assumption to office the NJM established a
People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) as the formal seat of
legislative power. This fourteen member group included nine
leaders of the NJM and five others, some of whom represented
business and the GNP. Also included were a medical doctor
and a school teacher. Ostensibly the PRG was the provisional
government, as previously outlined in the NJM's Manifesto,
which would ultimately give way to the National Assembly.
Effective power over Grenada, nevertheless, was in the hands
of the Central Committee of the NJM. The day-to-day running
of the government was administered by the nine-member Political
Bureau, a sub-set of the Central Committee. In a very practical
sense, finally decision-making resided with Maurice Bishop,
who, from the first day of the revolution, emerged as its
leader, and ultimately, the leader of the country.
At the lowest level of organization and of decision-
making was the system of parish and zonal councils, which,
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at least in theory, assumed some of the consultative functions
previously undertaken by the national parliament. While not
fully organized and operational during the life of the PRG,
these local councils did provide some opportunity for the
ordinary people to participate in the affairs of the state.
One of the best examples of such participation was the struc-
turing of the National Budget for 1982.
The process for the preparation of the 1982 Budget
began with a "Conference of Delegates of M!ass Organizations
on the Economy" held in late January 1982. About 1,000
delegates representing each of the mass organizations partic-
ipated. This exercise was followed by a series of 25 zonal
and parish Councils organized and held throughout the country.
In addition, meetings were arranged with the private sector.
Finally,another general conference on the economy was called.
Altogether, approximately 20,000 people were involved in the
budget-making process which culminated in the presentation of
the completed budget by Finance Minister Bernard Coard in a
public gathering at the National Convention Center on March
9th, 1982. 1 0
Subsequent to the takeover of the government the PRG
suspended the country's constitution and ruled through the
issuance of "People's Laws". Initially, these "Laws" sought
to legitimize the status of the government and to restructure
more repressive legislation introduced by the Gairy regime.
Ultimately, these "laws" served to consolidate control by the
PRG over the state. Interestingly, the PRG did not alter the
status of the office of Governor-General and office-holder,
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Gairy-appointed, Paul Scoon. This fact was to play an impor-
tant role, in the days following the death of Maurice Bishop
as both the Organization of the Eastern Caribbean States and
the United States sought to legitimize their involvement in
Grenada. They argued that Scoon represented the legitimate
government of Grenada.
On the one level it could be argued that Bishop and
the NJM were attempting to create a most unique and even
utopian political system, which was more appropriate to the
scale of the Grenadian society than was the Westminster system.
The plan to involve the broad masses of the population in
national decision-making was a most ambitious and difficult
undertaking. Yet it may also be argued, with equal conviction,
that the NJM's popular assemblies was simply one stage to
moving Grenada toward the socialist model. And whereas
Grenada had not yet arrived at the socialist stage - the
coming into power of the working class, the revolution
was in the intermediate position or the national democratic
stage.
Repeatedly does one find the NJM claim that the revolu-
tion was at the "national democratic" stage. Bishop himself
stated 1l
"we see this revolution as being
in the national democratic stage.
We are an anti-imperialist party
and government, and we believe
that the process we are involved
in at this time is an anti-
imperialist, national democratic,
socialist-oriented stage of
development."
And on another occasion, as Bishop sought to explain "why
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Grenada could not proceed straight away to the building of
socialism", he emphasized,12
"(we) must first pass through a
stage where we lay the basis...for
the building of socialism. In other
words, comrades, what we are now into
(this national democratic stage)
really means two things. What we are
speaking about now is not socialist
construction, not the socialist
revolution, we are speaking about the
national democratic revolution, we
are speaking about socialist orienta-
tion."
Bishop sought to elaborate on the concept "national democracy"
by stating "it is 'national' because it arose from a national
liberation struggle". Further it was 'democratic' because "it
aims to give or restore rights and freedoms to the majority of
13the people".
Another ideologist of the NJM claimed 14 that as a conse-
quence of the particular structure of different economies, with
particular respect to which group controls the system of pro-
duction relations, it therefore follows that "each society
takes its own route to revolution". Since, as he continued,
"there is no 'orthodox' or 'traditional' route to revolutionary
change." And since the structure of the Grenadian economy was
characterized primarily by its dependent capitalist nature,
this inevitably means that the society was dominated by the
bourgeois and petty-bourgeois groups. As a consequence, the
working class group remained relatively small. The national
democratic stage will permit, an alliance of all groups,
initially, to control the state, and further, ultimately lay
the economic foundations for the eventual bringing into
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power of the working classes. At least, rhetorically, Bishop
appears to have endorsed this approach toward the transformation
of the Grenadian society.15
The Economic Program
Undoubtedly, the Gairy regime had left the economy in
a poor condition. Major problems faced by the new government
were negative growth rates, unemployment running at about 45-50
percent, a major deficit in the country's balance of payments
and a very high rate of inflation. Bishop had repeatedly
emphasized that the major thrust of his party was toward
meeting the basic needs of the majority of the society, who
had suffered both as a consequence of Gairy's mismanagement,
and further, because of the inherent structural weakness of
the economy. Such weakness was engendered by the historical
colonial economic domination and linkage; the consequent
openness of the economy making it susceptible to the vicis-
situdes of the international market; and the acceptance of
the dependent capitalist approach to 'development'.
Thus did the basic economic goal: providing for the
needs of the poorer masses, coincide with the national
democratic objectives espoused by the party. But again, the
rhetoric of the revolution was not matched by the economic
program pursued. Indeed, one of the major ironies of the
NJM, was that its foremost exponent of Marxist-Leninism,
Bernard Coard, who served as Deputy Prime M:inister and Minister
of Finance, was by all accounts a cautious and prudent director
of the state's economic policy. Thus, for instance, whereas
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NJM leadership repeatedly spoke1 6 of the "movement to
socialism, using the mixed-economy approach and the non-
capitalist path", this was not reflected in national economic
policy making.
Two major goals of the national democratic, non-
capitalist path would inevitably have included the expansion
of the state sector and the reduction of foreign-dominated
ownership within the economy. But at the time of the NJM
takeover, the Gairy government had already gained control of
some former privately-owned estates under the "Land for the
Landless" program. Thus did the Bishop government inherit
26 such state-controlled estates with an acreage of over
4,000 acres. By the fall of the Bishop regime the state
controlled 34 farms totalling 7,156 acres. It is obvious
therefore, that the vast majority of the land continued to
remain in private hands, regardless of the rhetoric of
state control.1 7
Another major plank of the national democratic path is
the reduction in foreign control over the economy. However,
as discussed in earlier chapters, Grenada's agriculture-
oriented economy was controlled primarily by a small, local
land-owning elite together with thousands of small farm holders,
Foreign ownership was concentrated in banking and insurance,
in the telephone and electricity services. The state quickly
acquired the Grenada Electric Service and the Grenada Telephone
Company, but nevertheless, moved much more slowly with regard
to the banking sector.
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By 1979 there were four foreign-owned banks in Grenada.
Soon after the coup the small state 'agricultural' bank
established by Gairy to provide loans to small farmers was
transformed into the Grenada Development Bank with the same
overall purpose. The Caribbean Development Bank, an agency of
CARICOM, assisted with the financing of its Grenadian counter-
part. Later, the National Commercial Bank was established by
the PRG and quickly became the second-largest bank. It acquired
the assets of the Royal Bank of Canada after that bank volun-
tarily decided to terminate its operations in Grenada. By
1983, approximately 45 percent of the banking industry was under
state control. Two foreign-owned banks continued to function
freely.
In addition to providing credit facilities to the small
farmer through the Grenada Development Bank, the Marketing and
National Import Board (MNIB) was established to seek out exter-
nal markets for non-traditional agricultural exports. Never-
theless, the marketing of major crops: nutmegs, cocoa and
bananas continued to be under the control of the statutory
marketing boards. A more fundamental function of the MNIB was
the exclusive right, given to it to import basic food neces-
sities of the population, in particular, rice, sugar and
powdered milk. Further, by also having the sole right to
import cement, the PRG was attempting to make more affordable,
housing construction to the poorer sectors. On importation of
other food items the MNIB was just another competitor with the
existing firms involved in the same activities. By thus
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circumscribing the authority of the MNIB, the state continued
to permit an active role for private enterprise. This respect
for private ownership is also evident in the hotel industry.
In 1973 the NJM Manifestol8 had made a blunt declaration
for the "complete nationalization of all foreign-owned hotels."
It demanded that the tourism industry "for the first time serve
the needs of Grenadians". To that extent, the NJM believed
the tourist industry could meet the development demands of the
society once it became responsive to local needs. National-
ization, it was then argued, would promote this end, by
facilitating the integration of that industry, especially with
regard to the development of backward linkages, within the
total economy. Once in office, the party did not follow through
with its declared intentions. The only hotels expropriated were
the three owned by Eric Gairy and his four restaurants. The
remainder of the industry was left virtually untouched.
Overall, nationalizations originally planned were ulti-
mately not attempted. However, there was some steady development
of state enterprises. Altogether some 32 state enterprises
were in operation by October 1983. The early focus of these
enterprises was toward increasing self-sufficiency of the
economy. It was logical, therefore, that the state would turn
to agro-industries, since some of the raw material was readily
available. This in turn would reduce the food import bill,
and alleviate the fiscal deficit situation. A plant was
established for processing of local fruit into juices and
jellies. Similarly, a fish processing plant was built by the
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National Fisheries Corporation. The Sandino Housing Plant
was established to produce prefabricated housing units. Never-
theless, in spite of the expansion of the state sector, by the
end of the four year period, 1979-1983, it accounted for less
than 25 percent of the Gross Domestic Product.
The overall performance of the state enterprises, at best,
demonstrated a checkered record. Many of these enterprises
were run at a loss. The state farms for instance, even since
the days of Gairy were showing substantial loses. All that
the PRG was able to achieve was a reduction in these losses. A
post-revolution analysis by Agriculture Minister Brizan claimed
state farm losses at $ 3.4 m. ($G.) between 1981-83.19 This
figure was lower than the Gairy years, while state farm acreage
had almost doubled. The primary reasons for such losses and
for problems with the country's agriculture in general, between
1979-83 were floodings due to the effects of Hurricane Allen
in 1979, plant diseases, and world economic conditions which
forced Grenada to stockpile its nutmeg crop. In addition,
Coard himself admitted 20 that state enterprises suffered from
weak management, lack of organization, low worker productivity
and use of low level technology.
In order to rebuild the country's infrastructure, which
deteriorated steadily during the last years of the Gairy regime,
the PRG embarked on a dramatic program of state capital
investments. In the last year of Gairy's rule, 1978, capital
investment was $8 m. This figure doubled in 1979, reached
40 m. in 1980, and by 1982 was over $100 m.2 1 As a consequence,
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whereas unemployment stood at 49 percent immediately prior to
the coup, it dropped to 14.2 percent by 1982.22
With the emphasis upon meeting basic needs, the govern-
ment's economic program went beyond combatting the unemploy-
ment problem. Capital investments were directed to the areas
that influenced the lives of the majority of the population.
Basic necessities as pipe-home water and rural electrifica-
tion programs were either upgraded, or begun in the areas where
they were previously non-existent. By 1982, 49 miles of feeder
roads and 15 miles of main roads were built, thereby facili-
tating the transportation of agricultural produce. Major trans-
formations were undertaken in social welfare programs. Thirty-
seven cents of every dollar of capital investment were directed
toward health and education.23 The number of doctors was almost
doubled, from a ratio of 1:4000 in 1978 to 1:2700 in 1982.2 4
Dental clinics increased from one to seven.
The PRG placed great emphasis upon development and
expansion of educational programs. At the primary level, free
books, uniform and lunches were provided for children from
lower income families. Free secondary education, initiated in
the last years of the Gairy regime, was fully implemented by
the new government. While under Gairy Grenada had defaulted
on its payments to the common University of the West Indies
(UWI), thereby inhibiting access for qualified Grenadian
students, these defaults were repaid. Over 110 Grenadian
students were granted scholarships for study at U.W.I., and
in Cuba, Mexico, the Soviet Union and in Europe.
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While illiteracy in Grenada was relatively low, it was,
nevertheless, substantially higher among the older population
than the young. With the assistance of volunteers from other
countries the Center for Popular Education was established to
offer a basic literacy program directed to the adult population.
The overall plan called for the eradication of adult illiteracy
by 1985. A second phase of the program sought to eradicate
functional illiteracy by offering night school programs for the
adult working population. The total educational program of the
PRG amounted to 21.3 percent of recurrent expenditure in 1981
and 22.5 percent in 1982. 25
In a comprehensive assessment of the Grenadian economy
under PRG rule the World Bank 26 reported that while the govern-
ment had "inherited a deteriorating economy", after three years
"Grenada has been one of the few
countries in the Western Hemisphere
that continued to experience per
capita growth during 1981"
The Bank reported that the economy grew by 2.1 percent in 1979,
3 percent both 1980 and 1981 and 5.5 percent in 1982. 2 7
But any general assessment of the PRG's economic perfor-
mance must take into consideration to what degree was the
national democratic objectives of the revolutionary govern-
ment fulfilled. Was the government in fact able to move the
economy toward the socialist path. Most would probably agree
that the vocabulary of the revolution was not matched by the
practical economic policies pursued. After four years the
vast majority of land acreage remained in private hands. The
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PRG, in fact, did very little to confront the elite land-
owning class. Much of state land had been inherited from the
Gairy regime. State enterprises were established, yet con-
tributed only one-quarter toward the GDP. The centers of
economic power in St. Georges remained largely untouched.' The
establishment of the MNIB merely set the government in competi-
tion with the domestic capitalist class. There was no attempt
to replace this class. It would appear that the government
accepted the strictures of the dependent capitalist model, and
where possible, sort to modify and to make it more efficient,
while in the countryside, broad infrastructural programs were
instituted in the attempt to meet basic needs. Together un-
employment was dramatically reduced, at least over the short
term, while popular aspirations increased. The basic struc-
tural problems of the economy, nevertheless, were not confronted.
The incompatibility of this approach, was beginning to be
apparent during the last few months of the revolution as the
regime experienced rising dissent from among its supporters in
the poorer classes. This situation of increasing uneasiness
apparently hastened the revolution's demise.
The Human Rights Record.
Until the 1979 coup, Grenada's political system, at
least formally, was patterned after that of its colonizer,
Britain. Electoral politics is traditionally viewed as an
important component of this system, giving the electorate the
right to effect change if it so desires., The Grenada coup,
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therefore, was the first instance in both Grenada and in the
English Caribbean where change was achieved by non-peaceful
and non-electoral means.
In his first official speech to the country on the
morning of the coup Bishop promised that freedom of elections
would be restored. A month later Bishop2 8 seemed less con-
cerned about the immediacy and urgency of elections. He argued
that an immediate priority was the "consolidation of the
revolution". He suggested that after an enumeration of voters
the country would be ready for elections. The fact remained
that some four and one-half years later elections had not yet
been held. By that time Bishop had taken the position that
democracy was much more than "just an election", dismissing
the idea of casting a ballot was "five second democracy".29
In its place he consistently promoted the notion of a partici-
patory democratic system, in accordance with the developing
People's Assemblies, with the requirement that elected
officials be continuously responsible and accountable to these
assemblies. However, by mid-1983 Bishop had announced the
establishment of a constitutional commission. It was antici-
pated that subsequent to the formulation of a new constitution
elections would be held.
It is entirely possible that had the PRG government held
an election, won by the NJM, such a government would yet be
running the country today. An election would have provided the
NJM the elusive legimacy it always sought; would have released
some of the domestic pressures for rapid solutions to domestic
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problems; would also have served to nullify some of the constant
criticism from the United States. But clearly within the NJM
there were at least two opposing positions with regard to the
holding of elections. The Marxist position of Bernard Coard
would probably perceive of elections as a "bourgeois" exercise,
and that power, once obtained, should be held. Bishop, himself,
appeared to take the position that the people's assemblies was
a more appropriate democratic form than the Westminster system.
Yet after four years he established the constitutional
commission as a forerunner to staging elections. But most
fundamentally, the NJM did not encourage elections, because
they were unsure of its outcome. Their past performance in
electoral politics was only partially successful. There was
always a core of the supporters of Gairy to be considered.
But the fact remains that elections were never held. Grenadians
were not provided the opportunity to express their views on
the government by electoral means. The accepted norms of
behavior which peoples of the English-speaking Caribbean
states had grown accustomed to, had been thereby violated.
The question of constitutional legitimacy dogged the regime both
domestically and within the region.
The refusal to hold elections was part of a new system of
relationships enunciated by the PRG with regard to the Grenadian
population. Fundamental to the new relationship was a suspension
of the 1974 Constitution, and rulership by the periodic decla-
ration of Peoples Laws. Some of these laws violated the basic
rights to the populace. For instance, People's Law No. 8
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provided for preventive detention without charge or trial of
persons suspected of endangering public safety. By 1981 over
100 people were detained under this law. By October 1983 it
was believed that there were 78 political detainees at Richmond
Hill Prison, and another 25 members of the Rastafarian sect held
at the Hope Vale detention camp. In 1983, Amnesty International
itself admitted to not knowing the total number of persons being
held in preventive detention.30
In addition to detention without trial, there were
numerous allegations of ill-treatment and even torture of
political detainees. Rusell Budhlall and Layne Phillip, for
instance, both claimed to be kicked, beaten and burnt while being
held in detention.31 Amnesty International sought to investi-
gate these charges but with limited success.32 However,
Episcopal Archdeacon Huggins was permitted to conduct weekly
religious services at Richmond Hill, which permitted him the
opportunity to monitor activities there, and thrice-weekly
visits were made by doctors to that prison. 33
While the traditional British common law system continued
to be applicable for ordinary criminal offenses, the preventive
detention system operated separately, thereby denying the
individual the basic right to a fair, speedy and public trial.
These cases were periodically reviewed by a three-member
detention tribunal, under Bishop, in his capacity as Minister of
Interior, according to a 1980 law. However, as a consequence
of the irregular nature of this review process, a few were
detained for almost the entire period of the PRG government.
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Such were the cases of Lloyd Noel, a former NJM member,
and the PRG's first Acting Attorney General, Leslie Pierre,
editor of the Grenada Voice, a newspaper banned by PRG, and
Tilman Thomas, a shareholder in that newspaper. These indi-
viduals were detained when the newspaper published its first
issue after the coup, even though the paper had declared itself
loyal to the revolution, while reserving the right to criticize.
With the closure of the Voice, the Torchlight and the Catholic
Focus, freedom of the press ended, and indeed, freedom of
speech was severely curtailed.
While there were no direct attempts to curtail the free-
dom of worship it is clear that the PRG believed that the
established churches were a threat to the revolution. In a
detailed secret analysis of the Grenadian church it was re-
peatedly stated that the churches were opposed to, and even
gearing up for a "confrontation with the government." 34 And
while this conclusion might have been somewhat of an over-
statement, it was almost inevitable that the church would be
perceived as a threat to the revolution.
In a country of some 110,000 people over 70,000 were
members of the Roman Catholic Church. Most of the others
maintained membership in the Anglican or the Methodist churches,
or in one of the many small, charismatic, American-led, non-
traditional churches that had established bases in Grenada over
the previous decade. In general, the Caribbean lower classes
are deeply religious, and such groups in Grenada would undoubt-
edly have perceived the revolution as fundamentally "unchristian",
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even as a threat to their religions. The growing feeling of
suspicion and hostility was therefore mutual.
The church sought to counteract the impact of the
revolution upon the minds of its adherents by aggressive
sermonizing, the publication of pamphlets, and the introduction
and encouragement of the reading of the Jerusalem Bible, written
in simple novel form. It also sought dialogue with the PRG
and was further involved in state development projects. The
government, on the other hand, assumed, with some justification,
that the church, and in particular, the Roman Church was "hostile
toward the Grenada Revolution", 35 and sought to combat this
assumed hostility. Having concluded3 6 that
"the church in the immediate period
(was) the most dangerous sector for
the development of internal counter
revolution,"
a secret report recommended the building of mass organizations,
the organization of community programs, removal of "deeply
religious" head teachers from the school system, introduction
of political education in the schools and strengthen contacts
with Latin American clergy "linked to the theology of libera-
tion."37
The consolidation of the revolution, domestically, did
not detract from the external relationships developed and
pursued by the PRG. Indeed the leadership promoted such
relationships aggressively, in spite of the fact that much of
these relationships served to escalate the level of tensions
between Grenada and the United States. To a great extent the
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revolution believed that the building of national independence,
domestically, was inextricably linked to independence in foreign
policy and from support received from external actors.
PART II
Grenada in the International Environment
In the five years between the granting of political inde-
pendence and the takeover of the government by the Bishop group,
Grenada's foreign policy was dominated by Eric Gairy. Gairy
occupied both the positions of Prime Minister and the portfolio
of Minister of Foreign Affairs. Yet it was primarily the
eccentricities of the leader, not only his formal position,
which influenced the foreign policy of the state. Gairy for
instance, was born in humble surroundings, was dark skinned
and had a limited education. He was generally looked upon as
socially inferior and rejected by the Grenadian elite. In
that context it is interesting that he vigorously pursued a
foreign policy of recognition and respect for Grenada and for
himself. In 1975, for instance, in his annual address to the
United Nations General Assembly, he stated3 8
There are some truly great people in every part
of the globe. It is not the place or the size
of the place in which he was born, nor the
family to which he was born, nor the colour of
the skin that makes him truly great.
It appears that Gairy transferred his feeling of low self-
esteem to the perceptions of others concerning the state.
Hence in an apparent effort to convince himself of how others
viewed Grenada he said,3
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We are the smallest member of the United
Nations Organization but we are enamoured, we
are loved, we are esteemed and respected by
virtue of the contribution we make in matters
of regional importance and in matters of
international magnitude.
Gairy futher believed that for Grenada to gain international
recognition and respect it was incumbent upon himself to intro-
duce new and different issues to the international community.
This is possibly one reason why he introduced such bizarre matters
as the Unidentified Flying Objects, the Bermuda Triangle and
psychic research, to the discussion at the United Nations.
Another reason for his interest and promotion of these matters
may have arisen from his religious fervor. Gairy was deeply
religious in a somewhat animistic sense, thus in his five ad-
dresses to the United Nations one of his major themes was the
"Universality of God." He tried for those years to convince
the U.N. Organization to discuss this issue, believing as he
did that it would thereby contribute to the alleviation of world
tension!
This was the background to Grenadian foreign policy as the
PRG assumed control of the government five years after indepen-
dence. Undoubtedly, Grenada, specifically Prime Minister Gairy,
had shaped a quite unorthodox foreign policy path, and one which
would have been difficult for any succeeding government to
follow. The PRG, nevertheless, had much earlier determined the
route it would follow, since this route was originally outlined
in the 1973 Manifesto of the New Jewel Movement (NJM).40
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The pre-Independence NJM proposals for the country's par-
ticipation in regional and in international affairs were not
unlike the party's program for domestic change. Indeed, the
NJM seemed to accept the position that restructuring of the
society, internally, would require new orientations, in the
context of the accepted pro-Western Commonwealth Caribbean
foreign policy, in its international affairs as well. Since
the NJM believed that restructuring of the domestic economy
would require a cessation of the external economic linkages:
in terms of ownership, foreign investment, general external
dependence etc. the party proposed a foreign policy that
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support[ed] the organization of Non-Aligned
Nations in their courageous attempts to
prevent big-power domination of their
economies and internal politics and propose
to join that Organization at the earliest
possible opportunity.
In addition, the NJM Manifesto supported the political
and economic integration of the Caribbean, while emphasizing
the belief that the existing Caribbean Economic Community
(CARICOM) was an ineffective vehicle for this purpose. The
NJM was critical of CARICOM since it believed the latter did
little to meaningfully involve the poorer masses in the inte-
gration process. Further the NJM's proposals called for the
integration of the entire region transcending colonially-im-
posed artificial boundaries. CARICOM has only involved
English-speaking countries in the region. In the broader
realm of international affairs, the Manifesto condemned the
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U.S. involvement in the affairs of South Asian countries;
supported liberation struggles throughout the world; and de-
manded the ostracism of South Africa from the community of
nations.
It is therefore clear that the NJM was determined, from
the beginning, to chart a course, both domestically and inter-
nationally, that challenged the prevailing behavior of
regional states, with the exception of Cuba. And moreover,
such a course ultimately violated the prescriptions of the
United States for the hemisphere, thereby making the prospects
for confrontation with that hegemonic power almost inevitable.
Upon assuming control of the country in March 1979, the
PRG faced two immediate and urgent problems arising from
domestic pressures which together served to influence the
foreign policy of the state. The first was the fear that
Gairy would seek to lead an invasion of the island and return
to power. The second involved the determination of the PRG
to rebuild the Grenadian economy and the consequent need for
external assistance to achieve this.
The PRG was genuinely fearful of a Gairy-takeover and
their possible inability to prevent this. The fear was based
upon ten years of opposition to Gairy and the awareness of his
willingness to do whatever was necessary to remain in power.
Bishop and his supporters were painfully aware of their bloody
and brutal confrontations with Gairy, and now that he was
forced out, would he not be willing to resort to the same
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tactics that he used while in office? Gairy himself had declared
in interviews in the U.S. his determination to return to leader-
ship of Grenada. Further, Bishop claimed to have secured
evidence implicating some of Gairy's U.S. underworld supporters,
who had earlier found a safe haven in Grenada, for collecting
arms to stage a takeover.42
To counteract a possible Gairy-led invasion the PRG quickly
acted on two fronts. Firstly, it called upon regional states to
grant formal recognition of the new government, requesting the
same from traditionally friendly Western states. This would have
granted the regime much-coveted international legitimacy, thereby
making illegal any attempts by Gairy to win power. Secondly, and
more practically, Bishop made an international plea for arms to
outfit his Fledging Peoples Revolutionary Army, in order to defend
the state against possible attack. He especially requested mil-
itary support from the United States, Canada, Britain and from
neighboring territories.
Whereas the English-Caribbean had been embarrassed by
Eric Gairy's antics, Grenada was left very much to its own
during the Gairy years. However, the Bishop-led takeover galva-
nized Caribbean leadership into action. While privately these
states were pleased that Gairy was forced out, they, to some
degree, objected to the manner in which it was done. While
firstly, political change in the English Caribbean, in accord-
ance with the Westminster system, was always achieved peace-
fully, Caribbean leadership began to wonder whether a precedent
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was now established for similar change in their own countries.
There were immediate calls for a regional meeting to discuss
the Grenada situation. While enthusiastic recognition was
immediately granted by Jamaica and Guyana, the latter regime,
especially, depending upon force to maintain political control,
recognition from Barbados and Trinidad was subdued. Members of
the Eastern Caribbean Associated states hastily arranged two
meetings, seeing the situation as a family problem. Recognition
from the broader international community was ultimately gained.
The call for arms to defend the state and the immediate
request, too, for economic support to reconstruct the economy
did not bring tangible immediate assistance. A few countries,
Jamaica and Guyana, particularly, responded in accordance with
their limited resources. Trinidad remained quietly hostile.
Barbados, eventually, was much more openly antagonistic. Many
larger countries adopted a wait-and-see attitude. The single
exception was Cuba.
The relationship between the NJM and Cuban leadership
pre-dated the March 1979 takeover in Grenada. Bishop and
Whiteman had visited Havana in August, 1977, for instance,
and while there discussed the significance of the Cuban
revolution and of socialism for Grenada.43 Undoubtedly, Bishop
was a greater admirer of Fidel Castro. Indeed, some have
speculated, though no evidence has ever been provided, that
the efficiency of the overthrow of Gairy could only have been
achieved with Cuban assistance.
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In April 1979, the PRG obtained its first shipment of arms
from the Cuban government. Within a few months both countries
approved an agreement which provided Grenada with a broad range
of technical support services, training and personnel to
develop the social and economic infrastructural base. This
was quickly followed by the arrival of a small group of Cuban
medical and dental technicians which permitted the establish-
ment of medical services in rural Grenada. Under Gairy these
services were offered primarily in the capital St. Georges,
and in few smaller towns.
In addition to support for infrastructural development the
Cubans offered a broad economic assistance package. To facilitate
self-sufficiency in food, Cuba donated twelve fishing boats and
corresponding technical support for the establishment of a
Grenada fishing industry. Trade ties were steadily expanded with
Grenada puchasing basic commodities, cement and sugar, from Cuba.
Later, Cuba offered a number of scholarships for university
study and organized cultural exchanges between these countries.
The strengthening of relationships between Grenada and Cuba
was part of a broad pattern of new relationships never before
sought by any English-speaking Eastern Caribbean state in the
international system. Significant among these relationships
was the immediate decision to seek entry into the Non-aligned
Movement which was in keeping with the proposals of the 1973
NJM Manifesto. Grenada was admitted to that Movement and
participated in the Sixth Summit Conference held in Havana in
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September 1979. Grenada was later elected to the co-ordinating
Bureau of that Organization.
It was at the Havana Conference, and a few months later in
a rally at Managua, Nicaragua, did Bishop outline the broad
tenets of the country's foreign policy. Bishop outlined the
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following principles:4
1) that Latin America and the Caribbean region should be
recognized as a zone of peace. There must be an end to the
Monroe Doctrine, and all other doctrines aimed at perpetuating
hegemonism.
2) the right of self-determination for all peoples must be
recognized and respected in practice.
3) the principle of ideological pluralism must be respected
in practice.
4) there must be an end to the arming and financing of
counter-revolutionaries.
5) there must be firm commitment to the ideals of disarma-
ment and world peace.
6) there must be respect for the sovereign equality, legal
equality, and territorial integrity of [our] countries.
7) the right of any country to freely join whatever inter-
national organization it wants.
One of the clearest early indications of the stringently
anti-imperialistic stance of Grenada was on the occasion of
the U.N. General Assembly's first vote to condemn the Soviet
Union's invasion of Afghanistan. While this resolution was
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overwhelmingly approved, Grenada voted against the condemnation,
and thus in support of the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan.
Bishop later sought to explain this vote, which was not in
keeping with the position of the Non-aligned Movement, by
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claiming
Non-alignment to us is a positive concept
embodying beliefs in positive principles.
As we see it, our first duty as a young
revolutionary country that believes in
non-alignment is always to support the
further development of the world revolu-
tionary process.
This convoluted explanation contributed little to an
understanding of Grenada's vote for it is difficult to understand
what "positive principles" Bishop was able to employ in support
of the invasion. Further it was certainly a new interpretation
to argue that non-alignment "always" supported the "world
revolutionary process".
A more practical explanation of the Grenada vote was
probably the desire of this young radical government, to
demonstrate, somewhat naively, to the Soviet Union that it was
willing to be counted, in the face of international opposition,
as a friend of the latter - an immature attempt to demonstrate
political maturity. Further, and equally naively, Grenada
appeared to be signalling to the United States its determination
to act autonomously regardless of the domination of the latter
over hemispheric relations. Earlier Bishop had announced to
the United States "we are not in anybody's backyard, and we are
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definitely not for sale".46 The vote in support of the Soviet
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Union was Grenada's repudiation of the philosophy of "backyardism"
or its more recognized synonym "spheres of influence".
The determination of Grenada to chart an uncompromisingly
independent foreign policy course; its development of close
relations with Cuba and later, the Soviet Union; its determination
to establish friendly relationships with revolutionary govern-
ments, especially with Nicaragua and with Surinam; and its
rhetorical war with the United States, altogether served only
to excercabate relations with the latter. Bishop would never-
theless have argued it was the United States that initiated this
hostile relationship.
United States Relations with Grenada.
The United States' relationship with Grenada can be
meaningfully examined only in the context of historical patterns
of relationships between the giant of the north and the formerly
colonial territories of the South. Indeed, America's interactions
with its southern neighbors pre-dated the former's independence.
Independence for the United States only served to strengthen its
economic interests within the region, to the extent that when
the Haitian slaves revolted in the late eighteenth century,
Washington displayed few qualms about sacrificing democratic
idealism for crass economic self-interest by siding with the
Haitian planter class.
In 1823, President Monroe laid the broad outline for America's
future relationship with its southern neighbors in what subse-
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quently became known as the Monroe Doctrine. This Doctrine
sought to guarantee the independence of hemispheric countries
from foreign intervention while pledging the United States not
to interfere in their affairs. Within a few years the idea of
Manifest Destiny was added, promoting the belief that U.S.
economic and political superiority must inevitably lead to
hemispheric domination.
Toward the latter part of the nineteenth century gunboat
diplomacy went hand in hand with dollar diplomacy to extend the
U.S. economic penetration, and ultimately, its hegemony over
the hemisphere. The Spanish-American War provided the initiative
for the formal entry of the U.S. into Caribbean Basin countries
at this time. From then onwards the U.S. became a significant
colonial power in the region. Its domination ranged from the
outright annexation of Puerto Rico to the appropriation of the
canal corridor in Panama. Temporary occupations occured in
Nicaragua, Honduras, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Cuba
represents probably the best example of the interface between
economic considerations and U.S. policy of Caribbean domination.
In the late nineteenth century the U.S. steadily expanded
its economic investments in Cuba especially in the sugar
industry. Following Spain's defeat, massive amounts of U.S.
capital entered Cuba. U.S. investments grew from $50 million
in 1895 to $200 million by 1906 and increased by over six fold
to $1.24 billion by 1924. This economic penetration was
accompanied by military occupation and the establishment of a
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a U.S. military government. Yet Cuba was granted a compromised
independence in 1902, with the insertion of the Platt Amendment
into its constitution, which gave the U.S. among other rights,
the right to intervene to protect Cuban independence.
Against the background of the Platt Amendment, President
Theodore Roosevelt in 1904 declared his "corollory" to the
Monroe Doctrine. Essentially, the Corollory re-emphasized U.S.
hegemony over the hemisphere, declaring its right and respon-
sibility to the maintenance of hemispheric peace. It was not
until Franklin Roosevelt's enunciation of the "Good Neighbor
Policy", in 1934 did the U.S. conclude a new treaty with Cuba
effectively abrogating the Platt Amendment. It is worthy to
point out that the U.S. occupation of Cuba in 1898 was the
first of thirty-three such military interventions in this
hemisphere, until the invasion of Grenada some eighty-five
years later.
The Cuban pattern was repeated throughout the northern
Caribbean, initially, and then over the entire region: a
policy of military occupation accompanied by economic penetra-
tion. To that extent, what is taking place in Grenada pos-
October 1983 follows a U.S. pattern for the region which
originated in Cuba in 1898. Whereas the northern island,
especially Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic were
the first to be dominated, the southern territories were yet
colonies, primarily of England. As the latter began its
withdrawal by mid-twentieth century, the U.S. sought to fill
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both the economic and security vacuum. By this time the U.S.
"Bootstrap" approach to economic development was firmly in place
in Puerto Rico, and being adapted at a furious pace throughout
the region. This approach, ostensibly, brought U.S. capital
and technology together with Caribbean resources and abundant
cheap labor in a tax haven environment, to promote industrial-
ization as the means to development.
By the 1970's almost one-half of U.S. trade, two-thirds
of its imported oil, and over fifty percent of its imported
strategic minerals entered the country by way of the Panama
Canal or through Caribbean waters. While some of these
strategic materials merely passed through the region, a sig-
nificant proportion originated there. In recent years, Jamaica
has supplied over 50 percent of U.S.-bauxite and alumina
imports. Further toward the end of the decade about 70 percent
of U.S. oil imports and over 80 percent of its residual fuel
imports came from Caribbean refineries. Over the past century,
therefore, the Caribbean has been developed as a safe and
secure haven for a substantial proportion of United States'
foreign investments and a major source for some strategic
materials. Further, located on the soft under-belly of the
U.S., strategically close, with numerous potential harbors,
the Caribbean in the "wrong" hands presents a vital security
threat to the U.S. For these two reasons, therefore, the
U.S. has maintained a close watchful eye over the region
during the present century, permitting only those regimes,
39
including that of the Somoza's in Nicaragua and the Duvalier's
in Haiti, willing to serve its interests.
In keeping with its traditional objectives for the
Caribbean, the establishment of the Bishop government in
Grenada must have been the cause for great concern within the
U.S. Department of State. The English Caribbean had become
accustomed to change by peaceful means. Moreover, change,
whenever it occured, did not signal restructuring of economic
or political relationships with the West. Bishop threatened
to achieve both these objectives. Even more significantly,
Caribbean states, with the possible exception of Jamaica, had,
even by the late nineteen seventies, in spite of formal recog-
nition, maintained a policy of distancing themselves from Cuba.
America's nemesis in the Caribbean continued to be isolated
some twenty years after Castro's coming into power. It was
known that Bishop and some of the NJM had made previous trips
47to Cuba. Since 1973 their Manifesto, , while not mentioning
Cuba by name, had called for "genuine integration of all the
Caribbean", and saluted the "just and heroic struggle being
waged on Caribbean soil."
On the second day of the NJM takeover, in its first
meeting with U.S. representatives, the new government pleaded
for economic assistance to rebuild the country. The American
Consul-General assured the Bishop government that he would
encourage his government to provide the necessary assistance.
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One month later no such aid had been granted, but in the
meantime two sets of circumstances laid the basis for the
souring of relations between the U.S. and Grenada. Gairy
from his base in California, repeatedly declared on radio the
need for a counter-coup and called for the U.S. to support
him in this attempt. The Bishop government, claiming to find
evidence in Grenada supporting Gairy's initiatives, issued
pleads of its own for military assistance to repel any possible
counter-coup. Likewise it continued making appeals for economic
assistance. The second circumstance arose from the almost
immediate positive response from the Cuban government with
economic and later, security assistance.
On April 7, about three weeks after the initial takeover,
a Cuban delegation arrived in Grenada to open talks on assistance
programs. The U.S. was immediately angered, moving from a
posture of cautious acceptance to one of confrontation. Within
a few days U.S. ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean, Frank Ortiz,
arrived in Grenada, sternly lecturing Bishop and his government
of the hazards of the establishment of a working relationship
with Cuba. 4  He expressed his government's formal displeasure
concerning establishment of relations between Grenada and Cuba,
and threatened adverse implications for Grenada's tourist
industry if such relationship was permitted to continue.
Ambassador Ortiz informed the Bishop government that U.S. aid
program to the region was provided only on a multi-lateral
basis, through the Caribbean Development Bank. He suggested
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that Grenada look to that Bank for aid assistance. Additionally,
Ortiz offered the now famous $5,000 which according to his
successor, Sally Shelton was 4 "the then-allowed level of
funding per project which an Ambassador could make from [the]
Special Development Assistance Fund". Bishop looked upon this
offer as a gratuituous insult.
Ortiz ended his discussion with the Grenada government by
handing Prime Minister Bishop a formal statement5 prepared
by his government which stated in part
although my government recognizes your concerns
over the allegations of a possible counter-coup,
it also believes that it would not be in
Grenada's best interest to seek assistance from
a country such as Cuba to forestall such an
attack. We would view with displeasure any
tendency on the part of Grenada to develop
closer ties with Cuba.
The young revolutionary government of Grenada was utterly
incensed by the callousness of the U.S. approach. It served
further to confirm the suspicions of this youthful group that
the giant of the north had not eschewed the "Big Stick"
attitude in the conduct of its foreign relations. Three days
later Bishop in a national radio address responded to the U.S.
ultimatum stating51
From day one of the revolution we have always
striven to have and develop the closest and
friendliest relations with the United States,
as well as with Canada, Britain, and all our
Caribbean neighbours.....But no one must mis-
understand our friendliness as an excuse for
rudeness and meddling in our affairs, and no
one, no matter how powerful and mighty they
are, will be permitted to dictate to the
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government and people of Grenada who we can
have friendly relations with and what kind
of relations we must have with other countries.
And relying upon the formal symbols of stateness which is all
that a microstate possesses, Bishop continued 52
Grenada is a sovereign and independent country,
although a tiny speck on the world map, and we
expect all countries to strictly respect, our
independence just as we respect theirs. No
country has the right to tell us what to do...
We are not in anybody's backyard and we are
definitely not for sale.
In an act of seeming defiance of the United States, Grenada
established formal diplomatic relations with Cuba the next day.
This, however, was more likely a move that had been under
consideration for some time. The die was cast. The war of
words began. From there onwards relations with the United
States went down hill, just as Grenada-Cuban relations steadily
developed.
It may be considered that U.S. Ambassador Ortiz committed
a major blunder in his first major discussion with the
Grenadians which set the stage for a rapid deterioration of
relations between the countries. However, while Ortiz's
dictatorial diplomatic style was his own, his message was not.
To that extent, his style was secondary to the message from
the Department of State: Grenada must be willing to have
minimal relations with Cuba in order to gain the blessing and
the support of the United States. A failure to do so meant
that Grenada must be willing to face the consequences. The
U.S. Administration's demands of Grenada were no different
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from the demands upon Nicaragua. Pres. Reagan demanded that
Nicaragua say "Uncle" to the United States. One could even
speculate that the U.S. was willing to push Grenada toward
Cuba, if only then to be able, later, to attack it for being
a friend of the Communists!
It appears that the State Department took an exceedingly
tough stand against Grenada, right from the outset, because
of the belief that Bishop and his NJM, even before the take-
over, were close to Cuba. Rationalizing this tough position
a State Department official said53
We think they've been commited to a close
association with Cuba from day one...think
of the precedent it would set...Throughout
the region, there are little-bitty leftist
groups with power ambitions. If we improve
relations with Grenada at no cost to the
(pro-Cuban) government, imagine what it
would say to other putative authorities in
the eastern Caribbean.
After the invasion a senior State Department official
said 54 similarly "nothing the U.S. did or failed to do would
have made any difference". The message from Washington was
exceedingly clear: the U.S. would not tolerate or negotiate
with any country, within its sphere of influence, that
believed its sovereignty permitted the right to engage in
independent foreign policy. Relatedly, the mind-set suggested
by this attitude was that a friend of Cuba was almost automat-
ically, an enemy of the United States. To that extent, then,
the quarrel with Grenada was ultimately not over the issue of
the future of democracy or of disrespect for human rights -
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especially since the U.S. does not appear to have serious
problems with Haiti on these issues - but over the right of a
sovereign state, under the shadow of a major power, to choose
its friends.
While expressing skepticism that a "more sustained
experiment with a positive U.S. policy would have succeeded,"
former U.S. ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean, Sally Shelton,
chided the U.S. administration, in a post-invasion analysis, for
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not trying, and stated5
I do believe...that the Carter and Reagan
policies of distancing ourselves from
Grenada, of refusing to exchange ambassadors,
of declining to engage in serious discussions
...were not conducive to improving relations
and providing an alternative to Cuba.
Instead of attempting to mend relations after Ortiz's
disconcerting visit to Grenada, both countries escalated the
rhetorical war which only served to further exacerbate
relations. For instance, as Grenada prepared to participate in
the Non-Aligned conference scheduled for Havana, a few months
later, the U.S. sent a cable to Grenada requesting that it
defend anticipated attacks at the Conference, on the Organiza-
tion of American States, by Cuba. Grenada could have chosen
to politely ignore that cable or even sent a private reply to
the U.S. Instead, said Bishop,56 publicly announcing the
contents of the message,
we decided to come to this conference to
speak out loudly and clearly on the side
and in the interests of the suffering
and oppressed people of the world and of
those countries and regions fighting for
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their freedom, independence, and national
liberation.
And to further annoy the United States, while cementing Grenada's
relations with Cuba, Bishop sought to extol the virtues of Cuba
stating 57
if there was no Cuba the world would have
not seen the first socialist revolution
in the West in this century. If there were
no Cuba we would not have been reminded of
the very important lesson that blockades,
barricades, and isolation cannot stop a
serious and determined people from consol-
idating their revolutionary process...Cuba
laid the basis for Grenada.
Yet Ambassador Shelton, while scolding the U.S. for not
making a determined effort to develop relations with Grenada,
remains unconvinced that the latter was serious concerning
the development of such relations. She asserts that at least
the Carter Administration initially attempted to work with
Grenada, but that three issues made this difficult. The first
concerned the conflict over aid to Grenada and the Administra-
tion's determination that Grenada work through the Caribbean
Development Bank. The second was with regard to the expressed
desire of the PRG to have Eric Gairy extradited to stand trial.
Shelton claims that the Grenadian government did not appear
serious about returning Gairy to Grenada, since they refused to
work with the U.S. Department of Justice to process the request.
Conflict over the arrest in the U.S. of two Grenadians charged
with illegally exporting arms to Grenada constituted the third
issue. This issue resolved itself when the Grenadians jumped
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bail returning to their country.
What Shelton does not mention is that about the same time,
as reported in the Washington Post, the National Security Council
had developed a plan for the blockade of Grenada. While that
plan was not operationalized, Grenada could not fail to have
comprehended the message from the U.S. Further when Shelton,
herself, was sent to replace Ortiz as Ambassador to the Eastern
Caribbean, the U.S. refused to accredit her to Grenada.
Similarly the U.S. refused to recognize the credentials of
Dessima Wilhaims as Grenada's ambassador to this country. With-
out a formal exchange of ambassadors there was no attempt at
establishing a serious dialogue between the two countries.
Unable to force the Grenada government to bend to its
wishes, the U.S. extended its propaganda war from late 1979 and
onwards. The media was employed to create a picture of an
increasingly repressive country, becoming more steadily aligned
with the Soviet Union, and therefore one not safe for U.S.
tourists. The State Department advised travel agencies against
recommending Grenada. Grenada's voting with the Soviet Union
on the Afghanistan issue provided the U.S. with additional
propaganda material. Further the U.S. brought pressure to bear
on its allies and upon international lending agencies, against
the provision of economic assistance for Grenada.
Grenada responded in the only way it knew how: an escala-
tion of its rhetorical war. Further to Bishop's address at the
Non-Aligned conference in September 1979, two speeches, within
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a few months afterwards, portrayed the degree of hostility
between the countries. In the first of these speeches
delivered at St. Georges to commemorate the first anniversary
of the revolution Bishop again expressed the "greatest debt of
gratitude to the Cubans." He again reiterated his earlier
point that there could have been no Grenadian revolution without
the earlier Cuban revolution. But his harshest words were again
reserved for the U.S. Obliquely criticizing the Monroe Doctrine
approach of the U.S. he said
to those who continue to believe that the
world begins and ends next door in America,
to those who continue to believe that the
United States...have the right to regard
this entire area as a lake, as an extension
of America, as part of their backyard, we
say, "No, we are not in anybody's backyard."
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The second of these speeches was delivered in Havana on
the occasion of the May Day celebration in 1980. Again Bishop
publicly attacked the Monroe Doctrine approach of the U.S.,
demanding respect based on sovereign equality and independence.
It was, however, Grenada's decision to build a new airport,
and the generosity of Cuba toward the building of that airport,
that most dramatically escalated the level of tensions between
the two countries. What Grenadians saw as a powerful symbol of
their resolve and determination to achieve economic development,
the United States saw as a symbol of the Soviet's presence in
the hemisphere.
48
The Airport Issue
On March 23, 1983, President Reagan, in his nationally-
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televized "Star Wars" speech declared
on the small island of Grenada...the Cubans
with Soviet financing and backing, are in the
process of building an airfield with a 10,000
foot runway. Grenada doesn't even have an
airforce...lore than half of all American oil
imports now pass through the Caribbean...The
Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada...can
only be seen as power project into the region.
For six days following, various U.S. television crews sought the
supposed Grenadian military base, the supposed military communica-
tion facilities, and thirdly, the so-called military barracks,
none of which were found. This did not prevent the Reagan Adminis-
tration from resurrecting the same false charges as partial
rationale for the invasion eight months later. What was important
for President Reagan was that his rhetoric and the accompanying
satellite pictures of the airport site would win the minds of his
U.S. audience, thus providing a foundation of popular support for
invasion a few months later.
The PRG did not initiate the idea of an airport at Point
Salines. Since the Second World War the British had selected
that area as the most appropriate site. After the War a British
consulting firm Scott, Wilson, Kirkpatrick and Partners had re-
confirmed the earlier decision. The reason was obvious. The
existing airport at Pearl's was located between the mountain
range and the sea. Its runway was 5,500 feet with no room for
expansion. There were no facilities for night landings. Tourists
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attempting to vacation in Grenada were required to overnight in
either nearby Trinidad or Barbados since obviously the existing
airport could only accommodate smaller aircraft. This additional
expense, and the generally unfavorable attitude of both Trinidad
and Barbados to the PRG, would not have encouraged the Grenadian
tourist industry. After some initial hesitancy the PRG had
embraced tourism as a major contributor to the development process.
And in this regard the World Bank had recommended the development
of the tourist industry to promote financial solvency. In its
1982 Memorandum, the World Bank anticipated the positive impact of
the completion of the airport for the expansion of the Grenadian
tourist industry.6
At the time the PRG was seeking aid to construct the air-
port, there were already ten airports in the region of the size
contemplated by Grenada. The country was also aware that the
construction of a 9,000 foot runway and airport in neighboring
St. Lucia had increased tourism there by almost 300 percent.
Ironically, the airport at Barbados, extensively used by the U.S.
during the invasion, was extended to 11,000 feet during the 1970's.
In none of these previous cases did the United States question
the length and purpose of the airports.
Some six months after obtaining power the PRG began seeking
funds to build the airport. The government first approached the
United States, Britain, Canada, European, Arab and Caribbean
countries for assistance. Not only did the United States flatly
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refuse but brought pressure on its allies to do the same. In
1981, the European Economic Community and Grenada organized a
conference to seek co-financing for the project. The U.S. again
pressured its allies to stay away. Some succumbed to this
pressure. Grenada's request to the International Monetary Fund
for $8 million was halved under pressure upon the Fund by the
United States. However, with assistance provided by Cuba, the
EEC, acting independently of its individual members, Libya,
Algeria, Syria, Iraq, Nigeria, some Scandinavian countries and
Venezuela, airport construction began.
Overall, Cuba's contribution to the airport construction
project was substantial-about 40 percent of total cost. However,
most of this contribution was in the form of manpower--about 300
workers, and construction supplies. Cuba developed a quarry and
built the first rock-crushing plant and asphalt mixing facility-
illustrations of the low level of pre-existing infrastructure,
and the need for modernization of Grenada. In addition, excavation
work at the airport was undertaken by Layne Dredging Company of
Miami, and the airport's communication system was being installed
by Plessey, a British company.
Most Grenadians supported the airport project enthusiasti-
cally, purchasing almost one million (E.C.) dollars of "airport
bonds" to help finance construction. To them it was the major
symbol of their independence and their determination to achieve
economic development. President Reagan, however, saw the airport
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as a major propaganda weapon in the Administration's war with
Grenada. The U.S. denounced the effort as an attempt by the
Soviet Union and Cuba to extend their power further into the
region. The argument presented was that the airport would serve
as a Cuban-Soviet military base which would thereby threaten the
security of the United States. Further, the State Department
added, the new airport would provide a refuelling stop for Cuban
planes on their way to Angola and also, the Soviet Union with an
important beachhead to control shipping lanes through with much
U.S. oil passes. Cuba, however, had been flying to Angola since
1975, and obviously, much earlier, had resolved its refuelling
problems. Also neither Trinidad nor Venezuela, the two countries
whose shipping could have been potentially affected, ever
complained. In fact, neither supported the U.S. invasion. But
even within State Department, itself there was skepticism
concerning the Administration's hysteria over the airport.6
One official confessed to "not being terribly worried" about the
airport construction elaborating that he "never put much stress
on the strategic importance of this whole region." Another hypo-
thesized that U.S. opposition to the airport construction had
served only to "push Bishop further to the left."
The United States, from 1979 until the invasion in late
1983, continued to charge that the airport threatened U.S.
security, and ultimately employed that charge as one of the
reasons for its invasion. Shortly after the invasion the British
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company Plessey denied that the airport could have been used
for military purposes, pointing to a number of the facilities
unavailable at the airport, including, for instance, underground
fuel tanks, which would have been necessary. Further, since the
British government underwrote the financing for the Plessey
contract, it certainly would not have done so if military purposes
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were intended.
The final paradox of the airport issue is that the United
States was one of the first countries from which Grenada sought
assistance when the PRG decided to build its airport. Bishop's
rationale to the U.S. and to others was that a new airport would
contribute to the expansion of the tourist industry, and therefore,
to the development process. Not only did the U.S. reject that
request, but it urged others to do the same. It eventually invaded
Grenada on the pretext that the airport threatened its national
security. This invasion was achieved with much cost: loss of
life on all sides, economic destruction, moral prestige of the
U.S. - although the latter does not figure prominently in the
Reagan foreign policy. Now that Grenada is under U.S. domination,
the latter provided a generous $21 million grant, of U.S. tax-
payers money to complete this project. The rationale for this
grant is that the airport would contribute substantially to
tourism development - the argument Maurice Bishop had presented
in the first place!
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Grenada, Cuba and the USSR: The Military Connection
Under Prime Minister Gairy, Grenada had established a small
army upon gaining Independence. In addition to the regular Police
services, Gairy had also organized an assortment of secret para-
military groups, among which was the notorious Mongoose gang, all
of which were personally loyal to Gairy. The PRG dismantled the
army and the secret branches replacing them with the popular-
based Peoples Revolutionary Army. By 1983, the army numbered
close to 600 full-time soldiers. The army was required, during
conditions of peace, to be fully involved in community development
projects.
In addition to the permanent army the PRG established a
voluntary militia. While at first somewhat disorganized, a bomb
explosion at a public rally in June 1980, ostensibly directed at
the leadership of the PRG, encouraged the government to re-
constitute and re-organize the militia. Members, however,
maintained their civilian jobs and were unpaid for serving in
the militia. They were drawn from a wide cross-section of the
population and numbered between 2,000 to 2,500 members. There
were plans to further develop the country's overall defense
65forces.6
There is no simple answer to the obvious question: Why
did the PRG consider it necessary to organize a relatively large
defense force? Initially, the PRG was undoubtedly fearful that
former Prime Minister Gairy, with some form of U.S. assistance,
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would lead a counter coup. Further efforts were organized within
Grenada,66 for example, the "De Raveniere Plot" and the "Budhall
Gang" to destabilize the regime. Finally, there was the bomb
explosion, apparently intended to eliminate the leadership of
the PRG, at the rally to celebrate Heroes Day. With regard to
external threats, the PRG repeatedly expressed the fear of an
invasion by the United States. Putting together the domestic
and external threats, the PRG undoubtedly would have believed it
was necessary to arm itself to defend the revolution.
For its part, the United States, with some support from
leadership in the Eastern Caribbean, claimed that the milita-
rization of Grenada was for the sole purpose of spreading the
Grenada model into neighboring territories. Indeed, this was
one of the major reasons presented by Eastern Caribbean leaders
for their 'invitation' to the U.S. to enter Grenada. To this
former ambassador Shelton has responded 67
I have not been convinced by the available
evidence that Grenada was training West
Indian leftists from neighboring islands
in the subversion of democratically elected
governments. The evidence presented to me
had been, quite simply, very thin.
As the Grenada - Cuban relationship steadily developed,
and ultimately expanded to close relations with the Soviet
Union, also, the PRG negotiated five military assistance agree-
ments: three with the Soviet Union, one with Cuba , and one with
North Korea. There is some evidence that a military relationship
may have also existed with Czechoslovakia and with Bulgaria.
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In general, the three agreements between Grenada and the
Soviet Union provided for the shipment of arms to the former;
specialist training in the Soviet Union; and intelligence and
security training for a few Grenadians. In the first of these
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agreements, for instance, the Soviet Union was required to
provide equipment valued at 5 million roubles, with an Annex
to this Agreement detailing the type and quantity of such
equipment. Article 6 paragraph 2 required that the terms of
the agreement be secret.
The second agreement with the Soviet Union was concluded
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on July 27, 1982, and increased the value of Soviet military
support to 10 million roubles. It also provided for extensive
training for Grenadians in the Soviet Union, and by Soviet
specialists in Grenada, in the operation of the military equip-
ment. The third agreement was an extension, from 1984-1986, of
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the terms of the previous agreement. Both agreements required
that the
Government of Grenada shall take all the
necessary measures to ensure keeping in
secret the terms and conditions of the
deliveries, all the correspondence and
information connected with the imple-
mentation of the present Agreement.
The preamble to the Grenada-Cuba Military Collaboration
Agreement 71 stated that the Agreement's purpose was with "the
aim of making a contribution to the strengthening of the defen-
sive capacity of Grenada". The primary focus of the Agreement
was the provision of Cuban military specialists to assist in the
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organization, instruction and "combative and campaign training"
and the development of "mobilization plans for the defense of the
country". An Annex to this Agreement called for the eventual
stationing of 27 "permanent specialists" and 12 short-term
specialists in Grenada. Under Article 111 provision was also
made for the granting of scholarships to Grenadian military
personnel for study in Cuba.
In an Agreement 2 signed on April 14, 1983 in Pyongyang
between Cuba and North Korea, the latter agreed to provide
"weapons and ammunitions" amounting to $12 million. Again it
was emphasized that "both sides shall strictly keep the secrecy"
of the agreement.
It was naive of the PRG not to assume that the completion
of military agreements with the Soviet Union, Cuba and North
Korea would almost inevitably draw Grenada closer toward the
Soviet bloc. And further, not to expect that the bloc would
expect a quid pro quo. Yet equally naively, the Bishop regime
stubbornly defended its right to conduct relations, and conclude
agreements with whatever state it alone determined, based upon
independence, sovereignty and formal equality. More pragmat-
ically, was the ever present fear of invasion from the United
States, and the need to defend against this. Though it is
difficult, in this regard, to understand how Bishop could have
conceived of defending against the awesome military might of
the United States.
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In retrospect, the collection of arms, eventually found by
the U.S., consequent upon the agreements, provided the latter
with some rationalization for the invasion, after the fact.
Yet again, the U.S. callously manipulated the facts of the arms
cache and hence U.S. public opinion. To support the argument
that Grenada was being prepared as a military base, and thus
the necessity for the invasion, the U.S. claimed to find
warehouses filled with arms. In actuality, according to the
Chicago Sun Times, 7 3 "the weapons in one of the warehouses
turned out to be sacks of rice and cans of sardines". And
further
as for the three warehouses that did have
weapons - they weren't stacked to the ceiling,
as the president said. They were about one-
fourth full. Many of the rifles were made in
1870...Others were WW II vintage...very little
modern weaponry.
In addition, the U.S. found some mortars, submachine guns and
rocket propelled grenades. Grenada, correctly or incorrectly,
would have argued that such arms were required to defend the
state.
The U.S. Response
It is obviously impossible for the outsider to know
whether the U.S. was aware, before the invasion, of the existence
of Grenada's military agreements. Regardless, the U.S. Adminis-
tration discounted the prospect for diplomatic negotiation,
choosing instead economic destabilization, subversion and the
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threat of force to return Grenada to Western domination. Thus
'Ocean Venture '81' was staged at Vieques Island near Puerto
Rico utilizing 120,000 troops, 250 warships and over 1,000
aircraft. The training exercise, code-named 'Amber and the
Amberdines', the official name for Grenada being Grenada and
the Grenadines, involved the capture of Amber, hold elections
and install a government friendly to the United States. The
PRG could have hardly missed the message. There were further
attempts at destabilization.
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In 1983 it was revealed that CIA Director William Casey
had proposed a covert action plan, two years earlier, against
Grenada and Surinam. It was dropped only after strenuous ob-
jections by the Senate Intelligence Committee. The plan,
eventually was never dropped, only postponed. By late 1982,
the U.S. had inspired a Caribbean Mutual Defense pact between
Barbados, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Dominica and Antigua, financed
by U.S. military aid to the member countries. Vere Bird, Prime
Minister of Antigua rationalized75 "in this region we cannot
afford to have another Cuba or Grenada".
There is considerable speculation concerning the active and
extensive involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in
Grenada during the Bishop regime. Some have pointed to the fact
that the NJM disintegrated extremely rapidly. The C.I.A.'s
history of promoting internal divisions within target groups
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have been long recognized. Some also speculate that
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the Grenadian army was thoroughly penetrated
by the CIA, and it is even possible that there
were collaborators on the Central Committee
itself.
For a U.S. invasion to be acceptable it was necessary to have
chaos in Grenada, and even the assassination of the leader.
The late Prime Minister Tom Adams of Barbados told a number of
British government officials, in early October that he antici-
pated problems, even assassinations in Grenada. That was three
weeks before the death of Bishop. U.S. ambassador to France,
Evan Galbraith, told French reporters the U.S. invasion had
been planned two weeks before the actual date. That was even
before the death of Bishop. He later retracted the statement.
Finally, it was widely reported7 7 that at least one student at
the medical school was a member of the CIA.
Grenada remained a relatively open society during the
Bishop years. It would have been very simple to establish a
CIA operation in the country. Since that country was openly
antagonistic toward the U.S. it is inconceivable that it would
not have received the close attention of U.S. intelligence
community.
Undoubtedly, the PRG must have felt increasingly threatened
by the continued destabilizing pressures from the U.S. and the
seeming inability to achieve a thaw in relations with Washington.
This was a major reason for Bishop's trip to the U.S. in June
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1983 when he stated
bad relations do not make sense. From our
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point of view, the need to ensure that even
more American visitors come to our country
every year is a critical and burning need.
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Yet another objective of the trip was to "try again to establish
some form of official contact with the government of the United
States." Bishop was not very successful in these efforts. The
U.S. did not permit meetings with officials of the Reagan
Administration. Bishop met with middle level State Department
officers and with a representative of the National Security
Council.
Ironically for Bishop, his attempt to mend relations with
the U.S. served only to increase factionalism within the NJM.
Within the Central Committee of the party, its leader was
increasingly perceived as soft, indeed "petit bourgeois" rather
than "Marxist-Leninist". This situation culminated in a
division in the party which ultimately destroyed the Revolution.
Conclusion
The final chapter of revolutionary Grenada is well-known
history. Within two months of Bishop's return to Grenada an
open conflict broke out in the Central Committee of the NJM.
The majority of the Committee charged Bishop with poor leader-
ship skills and lacking in "ideological purity." This majority
supported a proposal for joint leadership of the party: with
Bishop being required to share leadership with Coard. Bishop
agreed hesitatingly to accept the proposal yet asking for time
to consider its ramifications.
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Whereas Coard and his faction had continuously placed the
leadership struggle in the context of ideological 'purity' and
the demand for the party to play a vanguard role, it would
appear that what ultimately occurred was a struggle for power;
for control over the party and the state. The debate over
ideology, then, was primarily a tool to obscure what was essen-
tially a grab for power, motivated by greed and selfishness.
On his return from a brief overseas trip, Bishop and a few
of his colleagues were placed under house arrrest on October
13, 1983. When private negotiations for a peaceful solution
failed, thousands of Grenadians stormed Bishop's home and
released him from house arrest. Within an hour the crowd,
led by Bishop congregated at Fort Rupert. Armoured cars
appeared on the scene. Bishop and five supporters were
separated from the crowd and summarily executed. Between 50
and 400 others were also killed when bullets were fired into
the crowd. On October 25, 1983 the United States invaded.
Officially, the U.S. did not "invade" Grenada - even though
President Reagan himself first described it as such - but was
"invited" to participate in a "Caribbean force", upon the
request of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS).
U.S. forces numbered over 10,000, the Caribbean support group
was about 300 members, many of whom were not representative of
OECS countries. Much of the U.S. arguments for invasion have
proven to be legal fiction.8 0 Further, the U.S. began planning
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for an invasion almost one week before being "invited" to
participate. 81
The ultimate rationale, from the viewpoint of the United
States, ex post facto, is that much documentation concerning
the linkages between Grenada and Cuba, the Soviet Union and
other Eastern bloc countries was located and promptly taken to
Washington. Thus the U.S. claimed to demonstrate that Grenada
was drifting toward the USSR, precisely as the U.S. had warned -
neglecting of course, to concede, that as a sovereign state
Grenada, legally, possessed the right to conduct its own
foreign relations. Further the U.S. claimed to find huge arms
caches, ostensibly supporting their argument that Grenada was
being prepared as a military base.
Much of the future of Grenada and the Eastern Caribbean
lies directly in the hands of the U.S., even more than it did
in the past. Indeed, if anything, one of the major lessons of
Grenada must be that the U.S. is now more willing to pursue its
goals, aggressively, regardless of the attitude of other states.
The objectives of the U.S. for the hemisphere has, traditionally,
been two-fold: one, that the region does not threaten the na-
tional security of the U.S.; two, that the region maintain a
safe and stable climate for U.S. investments. That was the
lesson of the U.S. invasion of Dominican Republic in 1965, and
it is the lesson of Grenada in 1983. The legacy for the
63
Dominican Republic, twenty years later, is a society standing
on the edge of chaos. The legacy for Grenada cannot be
different.
64
Footnotes
1. B. Marcus and M. Taber. Maurice Bishop Speaks. New York,
Pathfinder Press. 1983. p.2 4 .
2. Caribbean Sun, April-May 1979. Quoted in Grenada: The
Peaceful Revolution. Washington, EPICA Task Force.
1982. p.54.
3. Trinidad Express. April 1st, 1979. An interview with
Maurice Bishop. This Trinidad daily newspaper was
generally considered to be unfavorable to the Grenada
revolution from late 1979 onwards. It strongly endorsed
the U.S. invasion.
4. Ibid.
5. Lloyd Noel, "March 13 Coup and After". Jamaica, Daily
Gleaner November 18, 1981. This conservative newspaper
was continuously critical of the Bishop regime strongly
endorsing the U.S. invasion which it termed an invasion
of Caribbean forces supported by the U.S.
6. Ibid.
7. Marcus and Taber, op. cit., p. 25.
8. Manifesto of the New Jewel Movement was reproduced in
Independence for Grenada: Myth or Reality. Trinidad,
Institute of International Relations. 1974. p. 143-156.
9. Ibid., p.153 .
10. For further details of the making of the 1982 budget see
To Construct From Morning: Making the People's Budget
in Grenada. St. George's, Fedon Publishers, 1982.
11. Interview with Maurice Bishop in World Marxist Review. 1982.
12. "Lines of March for the Party". A speech by Maurice
Bishop to a 'general meeting of the party'. St. George's.
September 13, 1982. p.3 .
13. Ibid., p. 4.
65
14. Jacobs and Jacobs, Grenada the Route to Revolution.
Havana, Casa de las Americas. 1980. p. 32.
15. Lines of March. op.cit., p. 4-6.
16. See for instance Marcus and Taber, op.cit. p.22. See also
Jacobs and Jacobs, op.cit., Chapter IV.
17. Speech by Agriculture Minister Brizan was reported in the
Trinidad Guardian. February 20, 1985. p.5.
18. NJM Manifesto. op.cit., p. 148.
19. Brizan in Trinidad Guardian, op.cit.
20. As quoted in S. Ryan, "The Grenada Questions." Caribbean
Review Vol. XIII. No. 3. p. 39.
21. Marcus and Taber. op.cit., p. 294.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p. 295.
24. In the post-invasion period Grenada has undoubtedly suffered
from a reduction in the number of doctors, since improved
medical facilities during the Bishop period was the
consequence of the presence of Cuban doctors and para-
medics, all of whom have since returned to their country.
25. S. Ryan, op.cit., p. 7.
26. Economic Memorandum on Grenada. World Bank, August 1982.
27. Ibid.
28. Bishop's interview with the Trinidad Express. op. cit.
29. Marcus and Taber, op.cit., p. 302.
30. Amnesty International Report 1983. London, Amnesty
International Publications. 1983. p. 138.
31. Letters of Complaint from Russell Budhall and Layne Phillips.
Mimes. June 1983.
32. Amnesty International Reports 1983. op. cit.
33. Country Reports of Human Rights Practices for 1983. De-
partment of State. February, 1984. p. 569.
66
34. Secret Report on an Analysis of the Church in Grenada.
From CDT Michael Roberts to Major Keith Roberts.
Photocopy. 15 March. 1983.
35. Ibid.
36. Secret Report. Analysis of the Church in Grenada.
Ministry of the Interior. St. George's. Photocopy.
12 July 1983. p.5 .
37. Ibid., p.6.
38. D. Webster. The Role of "Leader Personality" in the
Foreign Policy of Grenada. M.A. Thesis. University of
the West Indies, Trinidad. October, 1983. The author
provides an interesting analysis of the foreign policy
of Gairy in Chapter II.
39. As quoted in Ibid., p. 46.
40. NJM Manifesto. op.cit., p. 154.
41. Ibid.
42. Marcus and Taber, op.cit., p. 29-30.
43. Ibid., p. 16-23.
44. Ibid., p. 75-77.
45. Ibid., p. 74.
46. Ibid., p. 31. The express "backyard" in its usage in the
Caribbean has a particular pejorative connotation.
47. NJM Manifesto. op.cit., p. 154.
48. Marcus and Taber. op.cit., 27-28.
49. Testimony of Sally H. Shelton before the Subcommittee on
International Security and Scientific Affairs. Mimes.
3rd November, 1983. p.4.
50. Marcus and Taber. op.cit., p. 27-28.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., p. 31.
67
53. As quoted in M. Massing, "Grenada Before and After".
The Atlantic Monthly. Colorado. February, 1984. p. 86-87.
54. Letter of Otto Reich, U.S. Department of State to Caribbean
Review. op.cit., p. 4.
55. Sally Shelton, op.cit., p.5.
56. Marcus and Taber, op.cit., p.56.
57. Ibid., p. 54-55.
58. Sally Shelton, op.cit., p. 2-5.
59. Marcus and Taber, op.cit., p. 80 ff.
60. Ibid., p. 96-100.
61. An exerpt from Mr. Reagan's speech was reported in "Grenadian
Menace", The Nation, 16 April, 1983. p.466.
62. World Bank Memorandum. op.cit.
63. As quoted in M. Massing, op.cit., p. 83.
64. New York Times. 3 November 1983.
65. Request for Military Assistance to the Peoples Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Grenada from the Armed Forces of the USSR.
(Photocopy) 2nd July, 1982.
66. C. Searle. Grenada: The Struggle Against Destabilization.
London, Readers Publishing, 1983. p. 39-40.
67. S. Shelton, op.cit., p.7.
68. Agreement between the Government of Grenada and the
Government of the USSR for Special and Other Equipment.
(Photocopy). 27th October 1980.
69. Agreement between the Government of Grenada and the
Government of the USSR on deliveries of Special and other
Equipment. (Photocopy). 27th July, 1982.
70. Ibid., Article 7.
71. Protocol of the Military Collaboration between the
Government of the Republic of Cuba and the Peoples
Revolutionary Government of Grenada. (Photocopy). n.d.
68
72. Agreement between the Peoples Revolutionary Government of
Grenada and the Government of the Peoples Republic of
Korea. Pyongyang. (Photocopy) 14th April 1983.
73. Chicago Sun Times. 1st November, 1983.
74. Washington Post. 27 February, 1983.
75. As quoted in C. Sunshine and P. Wheaton, Death of a
Revolution. Washington, EPICA. January 1984. p. 15.
76. Ibid., p.12.
77. Newsweek. 7 November, 1983.
78. Marcus and Taber, op.cit. p. 289.
79. Ibid.
80. See for instance American Journal of International Law,
Vol. 78. No. 1. January, 1984. p. 131-175.
81. Report by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command on
Operation Urgent Fury, to Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff.
28 February, 1984. The heavily censored public version
of this Report provides interesting insights to the U.S.
invasion.
69
